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INTRODUCTION 
on September 10, 193?, the Catholic Universe Bulletin of 
Cleveland carried the following article: 
Noted Savant Declares 
His Faith in God 
Non-Catholic Resigns 
Nazi Post to Accept 
Papal Honor 
VIENNA - (NC) - A scientist so 
distinguished that he had been 
awarded the Nobel prize and is 
one of the savants nruned by His 
Holiness Pope Pius XI to the new 
Pontifical Academy of Science, 
although a non-Catholic,has just 
made public confession of faith 
in religious belief. 
He is Professor Max Planck,one 
of the greatest savants in the 
domain of natural science •••• 1 
Doubtless many .Americans have never heard of Professor 
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Planck's contributions to scientific knowledge. Yet to call him 
"one of the greatest savants in the domain of natural science" i 
not to praise him beyond his due, for his Quantum Theory is the 
basis of a large part of contemporary physics • .An international 
authority on atomic structure, Neils Bohr, writes, for example: 
scarcely any other discovery in 
the history of science has pro-
duced such extraordinary results 
within the short span of our gen-
eration as those which have di-
rectly arisen from Max Planck's 
discovery of the elementary 
quantum of action.2 
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This discovery was given to the world after years of schol-
arly research, as a glance at Planck's.life will testify. He 
was born at Kiel, Germany, April 23, 1858 and at seventeen en-
tered the University of Munich with physics his chief subj~ct. 
He studied there and at the University of Berlin, receiving his 
doctorate in 1879. 3 
Having received his doctorate, )[ax 
Planck became a Privat Dozent at the 
Kunich University. The Privat Dozent 
is a university lecturer who receives 
fees but no salary. In 1885 Planck 
was appointed Professor of Physics at 
the University of Kiel and in 1889 he 
came to Berlin as Professor Extraor-
dinari us there. In 1892 he was ap-
pointed full professor in succession 
to Kirchhoff at the University of 
Berlin. In 1912 he became Permanent 
Secretary to the Prussian-Academy of 
Science. In 1919 he received the No-
bel Prize for~Physics. .And in 1926 
he became Professor :emeritus, 
Schroedinger succeeding him in the 
Berlin Chair of Theoretical Physics. 
In 1930 Adolf Harnack died and Max 
Planck was elected President of the 
:Emperor William Society for the Ad-
vancement of Science, which is the 
highest academic post in Germany.4 
This post he resigned in 1937 and became a member of the Papal 
Academy of Science. 
It was in 1900 that Professor Planck proposed his Quantum. 
· Theory as an explanation of a problem of heat radiation. Yet 
it soon became evident that Planck 
had brought to light something that 
not merely explained the puzzle of 
the spectrum of radiant heat but 
something that is universally fun-
damental in nature. This was shown 
by the gradual appl i cat] on of b] s 
theory in all directions.5 
In fact, twentieth century physics consists very largely in 
•quantizing" natural phenomena. 
Yet with this ever widening application of the Quantum Theory 
a new view of nature began to take shape in the minds of scien-
tists. To what extent the Quantum Theory was responsible for 
this new philosophy of science will be determined in Chapter I. 
It is true, however, that physical activity began to be looked 
upon as the chance motion of many particles rather than as the 
ordely movement of determining causes. From this belief it was 
but a step to the denial of the principle of causality. 
Max Planck, sensing that this change of opinion would ulti-
mately be hurtful to the best interests of his science, has him-
self written on the subject of causality in nature. He has given 
to the world his own theory of causation in three recent books, 
~ Universe in !!!!. Light of Modern Physics, Where is Science 
Going?, and The Philosophy Et. Ph.ysics.6 These works are true 
philosophical literature, for they endeavor to explain the ulti-
mate causes of natural phenomena by means of unaided reason. 
To study these three books, codifying their views on causal-
ity and examining the philosophical soundness of these views, is 
the purpose of the present thesis. The writer begins his task i~ 
no spirit of controversy but simply in the hope that his critique 
may clarify the truth. His first chapter will sketch the origin 
of the modern doubt about causality; the remaining chapters will 
~n~~inc~ P1Dnck's solution to this doubt. 
Notes to Introduction 
l. Catholic Universe Bulletin, Vol. LXIV, No. 11, P• 11. 
2. Max Planck, Where is Science Going?, translated by Jam.es 
Murphy, Norton, New York, 1932, p. 18. 
3. Cf. idem P• 20, 21. 
4. Idem, P• 21, 22. 
5. Idem, P• 26. 
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6. These three books are all published by w. w. Norton and Com-
pany, ?O Fifth Avenue, New York. Their dates of publication 
are 1931, 1932, and 1936 respectively. 
-s-· 
CH.APTER I 
THE PROBLEM OF PROBABILITY 
"In these days of rapidly recurring crises,• writes Rev. 
James McWilliams, s.J., "it is perhaps not surprising that there 
should be a crisis, if not something approaching actual bank-
ruptcy, in the realm of science. The most alarming symptom of 
this crisis is the frequent assertion that there has been a break 
down in the constancy of the physical laws."l Now this "constanc 
as been termed by scientists, rightly or wrongly, 'causality•.•2 
Since, then, this constancy seems no longer to exist in nature, 
any philosophers of science have concluded that causality like-
wise is non-existent. 
Erwin Schrodinger, who succeeded Planck in the Berlin Chair 
of Theoretical Physics, is inclined to hold "the new, a-causal 
(i.e., ~necessarily causal) point of view.•3 sir James Jeans 
says tha~ the "loose jointedness• of the universe "destroys the 
case for absolutely strict causation.•4 Such denials of causalit 
are characteristic of many leaders of the New Physics, and we mus 
understand their difficulties if we are to appreciate Planck's an 
ewer in his theory of causation. It is the purpose of this chap-
ter, therefore, to consider the modern attitude towards causality 
in nature. 
The scientific thought of the nineteenth century was dominate 
by Classical Physics. This view of nature had two fundamental 
tenets: first, matter is composed of atoms; second, energy is 
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propagated continuously. Rigid laws governed both the movement 
of atoms and the lllliform transfer of energy. Hence scientists 
held that, if they knew the present state of a physical system, 
they could describe all the motions that brought it to its pres-
ent arrangement and could predict with certainty all the activity 
that would ensue. 
There was, however, one operation in nature that did not seem 
to obey their rigid laws. This was the transfer of energy in a 
beam of light. As we are all aware, light waves carry energy. 
If we place our hand in a beam of slllllight, it becomes warm - the 
beam has brought energy which we perceive as heat. The heat en-
ergy received can be accurately determined by allowing the ray to 
fall upon a thermometer. 
The white light which comes from an incandescent solid, such 
as the glowing filament of an electric light bulb, is a mixture 
of several colors. These colors can be separated by a triangular 
piece of glass called a prism, as shown in Diagram. 1 on the next 
page. Six colors will be plainly visible: red, orange, yellow, 
green, blue, and violet. Now science has folllld that these colors 
are caused by light of different wave-lengths, the red having a 
long wave-length, the orange a wave-length slightly shorter, and 
so on. The violet has the shortest wave-length of all. 
It is evident from the diagram. that those colors which have 
long wave-lengths transmit fewer pulses per second than those 
which have short wave-lengths. We have seen that energy is 
transmitted by light. Now the classical physicist, assuming that 
Diagram 1 
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each of these colors had a continuous wave motion, would say: 
"The red waves have few pulses, therefore they will transmit a 
small amount of energy; the orange waves have more pulses, there-
fore they will transmit more energy; the violet waves have most 
pulses, therefore they will transmit most energy." Accordingly 
he would say that if the red waves gave a rise of ten degrees of 
temperature, the orange would give a rise of twenty, the yellow, 
a rise of thirty, and so on. In other words, the amount of en-
ergy would increase regularly, and this precisely because each 
beam of light flowed on- uniformly, while one beam had more vi-
brations than another. 
Yet when the physicist tried to verify his prediction, he 
found that the phenomena did not fit his theory. At both ends 
of the spectrum there is a small amount of energy given off,. 
with a sharp rise in temperature at the center (see Diagram. 2). 
Thus the red might give an increase of ten degrees, the orange 
of twelve, the yellow of twenty, and then the green might bring 
the thermometer to forty degrees, while the blue and violet 
would fall off again to the low amount of the red and orange.5 
In 1900, however, Professor Planck proposed a view radically 
different from that of Classical Physics. "Radiant heat,• he 
said, "is not a continuous flow and indefinitely divisible. It 
must be defined as a discontinuous mass ·made up of units all of 
which are similar to one another.•6 These units are not all of 
the same size: red light has small units of energy, orange light 
has larger units, violet light has the largest units of all. 
-12· 
p1a.nck called these units •quanta•, and his Quantum Theory states 
that these quanta are larger for waves with many pulses such as 
the violet, and small for waves with few pulses, such as the red.' 
This in itself, however, would not have solved the problem, 
for if the violet quanta are larger than the green, why do they 
not communicate more total energy? Hence Planck introduced a 
further qualification: these quanta are not emitted regularly 
like the bullets from a rapid-fire gun; their emission •will de-
pend on the principles of probability.•8 
just how this solved the problem can be seen from Diagram 2. 
The red quanta are small, that is, they. require little energy to 
send them from the source. Therefore it is very probable that 
red quanta will be emitted, and hence the number of red quanta is 
large. One of these quanta, however, has only a very small a-
mount of energy, and therefore, despite the large number of red 
quanta, the total energy sent to the red end of the spectrum will 
be small. The violet quanta are large, that is, they contain a 
large amount of energy. Yet, since much energy is needed to emit 
a violet quantum, the chances are small that a violet quantum 
will be emitted, and hence the total energy at the violet end of 
the spectrum will likewise be small. Somewhere between the red 
and the violet will lie a range in which the quanta have a fairly 
large amount of energy and for which the probability of emission 
is likewise high. This will be the range of ma.xi.mum temperature.~ 
The Quantum Theory, therefore, solved the problem of the 
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uneven distribution of heat. This it did by introducing a rad-
ically new view of energy. Classical Physics had thought of 
energy first, as composed of continuous waves, and second, as 
emitted steadily from the source. Quantum Physics maintained 
first, that energy was composed of discontinuous particles, and 
second, that these particles were emitted at random from the 
source. It is this second tenet that has so greatly influenced 
modern scientific thought; the real significance of the Quantum 
Theory for philosophy is not that it solved a problem of heat 
radiation, but that it made probability an essential part of tha1 
solution. Let us therefore consider what is implied in the term 
"probability". 
When a scientist says that one event is more probable than 
another he means that, of the two, the former will occur oftener 
than the latter if a very large number of trials is made. The 
reason why the former will happen oftener is that there are more 
possible ways through which it can come about. Thus in throwing 
dice, of the thirty-six possible combinations of the faces, ther• 
is but one combination that will give a two, and hence the prob-
ability of throwing a two is l/36. There are, however, six com-
binations that will give a seven, and hence the probability of 
throwing a seven is 6/36 or 1/6. In a large number of throws, 
according to the scientist, seven will thus be thrown six times 
oftener than two.10 It is this mathematical concept of proba-
bility which Planck applied in the Quantum Theory. Just as the 
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pro babi li ty of throwing a two is small, so the probability of th 
emission of a violet quantum. is small. .And just as the probabil 
itY of throwing a seven is large, so the probability of emission 
of a red quantum is large. 
But probability has a further meaning. There is indeed reg-
ularity in the result, regularity for example in the ratio of 
throwing a two to that of throwing a seven, but the individual 
events are determined purely by chance. Thus it is mere chance 
that a two should result from any particular throw, though the 
aggregate effect shows regularity. Similarly, it is mere chance 
which determines that a red quantum should be emitted instead of 
a violet one, though the aggregate result will show regularity. 
And the reason why one outcome is more probable than another is 
simply that the number of possible accidents is greater for one 
than for another; the chances for the former are greater. 
Diagram 3 on the following page is an attempt to show the 
difference between the view of nature adopted by Classical 
Physics and that accepted by Quantum Physics. First, to depict a 
whole physical state: state A, a body of water at ten degrees 
let us say, is always followed by state B, a temperature of 
twenty degrees, if the requisite quantity of heat is applied. 
The activity is inevitable and unique. 
The same rigid laws were believed to govern the individuals 
talcing part in the process. Each atom moves from position l to 
position 2, and their movements result in the change of the whol 
system. The activity of the atoms is also inevitable and uni u 
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Diagram. 3 
Classical Physics 
l ___ A 1.---..)[ .______... B I 
q,ua.ntum Physics 
c 
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In Quantum Physics, the process is conceived quite differ-
ently. State A may change to state B or state C or state D. The 
overwhelming probability, perhaps one million to one, is that it 
will change to state B. Yet because the direction is only highly 
probable, the activity is neither absolutely inevitable nor nec-
essarily unique.11 
Still more at variance is the concept of the activity of the 
units. The atoms move entirely by chance and we have as little 
right to call their activity inevitable as we have to call the 
outcome of a throw of dice or the spinning ~f a roulette wheel 
inevitable, 
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This, then, is the new view of nature which the twentieth 
century has brought to scientific thought. Two beliefs are fun-
damental to this view: first, activity in nature is aggregate ac-
tivity; second, chance, not order, rules the movement of its unit1. 
But why should this new picture of nature bring about a crisiu 
in the world of science? Why, in particular, should scientists 
be led to believe "that new physical theories have rendered the 
principle of causality null and vo1d"?l2 To answer this question 
we must consider how scientific men before the time of the Quan-
tum Theory looked upon causality in nature. 
Until the sixteenth century the accepted view of causality 
in nature was the scholastic dictum: "Physical beings are deter-
mined necessary causes and if left to themselves will produce the 
same effects under the same conditions.•13 It was Galileo who 
first decided to prescind altogether from metaphysical principles 
and "begin with experimental data."14 The course of events which 
followed this introduction of a method largely empirical is thus 
described by Rev. Joseph Kelly, S.J.: 
The scientific genius of men like Tycho 
Brahe, Kepler, and Newton produced a pic-
ture of the universe in which the actions 
of bodies, the laws of nature, and the 
order of the world. (were) expressed in 
mathematical terms. The accurate results 
obtained from this method obscured the 
philosophical concepts of the universe ••• 
A successful investigation of nature was 
to be found throuih the experimental 
method and the guiding principle was 
Physical Determinism, ••• the postulate ••• 
that natural activity will follow defi-
nite modes of action ••• 
Whether or not this was dependent upon 
the metaphysical principle of causality, 
the scientist did not inquire. He was 
content that experience justified him in 
the use of the principle and that he was 
able to generalize his experience and 
formulate his laws of nature according 
to which physical beings acted •••• 
An important consequence of this prin-
ciple has been a notable emphasis on the 
predictability of events. Since nature 
is determined in its activity and there 
is an invariable sequence of phenomena, 
it follows necessarily, as Laplace 
states, that if we know sufficiently the 
antecedent factors, we can predict the 
consequent results. Science bas adopted 
this course. This process introduced a 
practical identity between predictability 
and causality.15 
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From the foregoing analysis it is evident that the scientific 
concept of causality in nature consisted primarily in this: the 
philosophical notion of cause was neglected and causality was 
identified with predictability. 
Now the Quantum Theory denies on principle that absolute pre-
dictability can ever be completely verified, for predictability 
fails when chance governs the motion of particles. Science can 
tell what will be the most probable configuration of atoms or 
quanta, but it cannot predict with certainty. 
This, then, is the source of the modern doubt about the ex-
istence of causality in nature. The scientific concept of cause, 
a concept which confused causality with predictable succession, 
has been shown to be inadequate. 
Science, therefore, is faced with a serious crisis. A de-
cision has to be made between two alternatives: the deniaJ. of 
-18-
causality in nature or the assertion that causality holds even in 
those atomic processes which seem to be ruled by chance. Those 
who deny causality, the indeterminists, are thus depicted by 
Planck: 
(They) maintain that there is no genuine 
causality or law in nature, and that the 
illusion of their existence is due to 
the fact that certain rules are found to 
occur which are very nearly but not ab-
solutely valid. In principle the inde-
terminist looks for a statistical foun-
dation for every physical law, even in 
that of gravitation; all these laws are 
for him laws of probability, referring 
to averages drawn from numerous similar 
observations, claiming no more than ap-
proximate valifity for single observa-
tions and always admitting exceptions.16 
The second alternative, scientific indeterminism, is describel 
by Schrodinger as follows: 
We shall maintain that the behavior of 
each atom is in every single event de-
termined by rigid causality. .And we 
shall even contend that strictly cau-
sal determinism of the elementary proc-
esses, although we cannot observe their 
details, must necessarily be admitted, 
in order to allow the mass phenomena, 
which result from their operation, to 
be treated by the methods of statistics 
and the probability calculus. From 
this viewpoint causality would lie at 
the basis of statistical law.l? 
Scientists have taken sides upon these two alternatives. 
Some, such as Heisenberg and Dirac, are indeterminists; others, 
like Professor Einstein, favor the determinist view. One thing, 
however, is significant. Both sides mean by "causal.ity" exactly 
what science has always meant by it: predictable succession. ThE 
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indeterm.inists deny that equations can be found which will de-
scribe the chance activity of particles; the determinists look 
for a higher mathematical synthesis which will explain all motio~ 
of atoms and quanta. 
Into this controversy, in part at least precipitated by his 
Quantum Theory, Professor Planck has entered. He has endeavored 
to solve the problem of probability with what we have called his 
theory of causation. It remains now to examine that theory. Fol 
clarity's sake we shall consider his views under three headings: 
causality in the individual instance, causality as a universal 
law, and the relation of causality to free will. 
-20-
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CHAPTER II 
INDIVIDUAL CAUSATION 
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Since causality is nothing but an explanation of change in 
the real world, any adequate theory of causality must first an-
swer the question: Does the external world exist? Dr. Planck 
replies in the affirmatiTe in his first philosophical book by 
appealing to "reason• or "common sense.•l In his next book, 
Where is Science Goins?, he gives two "theorems•: 
(1) There is a real outer world which 
exists inde~endently of our act of know-
ing, and (2} The real outer world is not 
directly knowable.2 . 
Planck calls these propositions theorems because he maintains 
that they are not provable loiically but are rather truths which 
it is necessary for us to assume. This point of view is stated 
more explicitly in a later chapter of his second work: 
In other words, the fundamental prin-
ciples and indispensable postulates of 
every ienuinely productive science are 
not based on pure logic but rather on 
the metaphysical hypothesis -which no 
rules of logic can refute - that there 
exists an outer world which is entirely 
independent of ourselTes.... · 
Once the scientist has begun by taking 
his leap into the transcendental he 
never discusses the leap itself nor wor-
ries about it. If-he did science could 
not advance so rapidly. .And anyhow -
which is fundamentally a consideration 
of no less importance - this line of 
conduct cannot be refuted as inconsis-
tent on logical grounds.3 
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According to Planck, therefore, the existence of the external 
world is an assumption which it is necessary to make at the be-
ginning of any scientific investigation, an hypothesis which has 
the merit of self-consistency. In our critique of his theory in 
the second part of this chapter we shall endeavor to show that 
our belief in the existence of the rea.l world can rest on oth~r 
and more compelling evidence. 
Like the existence of the real world, eausall.ity seems to be 
something independent of us: 
••• the conclusion to which we are led is 
that causality is something fundamental. 
We suspect that it is ultimately indepen• 
dent of our senses and of our intelli-
gence and is deeply rooted in that world 
of reality where a direct scientific 
scrutiny becomes impossible. For surely 
it will be admitted that even if the 
earth with all its inhabitants were to 
perish, the cosmic events would still 
continue to obey their causal laws, even 
though no human being were alive to test 
the meaning and justification of such a 
claim.4 
Since the world exists, causality exists; the mind may as reason-
ably admit the latter as the form.er. 
What, then, is the nature of causality? Dr. Planck continues: 
I propose to commence the next stage 
with the simple and general proposition 
that an event is causally conditioned 
if it can be foretold with certainty. 
Of course I mean no more by this than 
that the possibility of correctly fore-
telling the future is a safe criterion 
of the presence of a causal connection; 
I do not mean that the two are identi-
cal. To take a familiar instance: dur-
ing the day we can foretell the coming 
of night with certainty and we may hence 
infer that the night has a cause; but we 
do not for that reason treat day as being 
the cause of night. On the other hand 
it frequently happens that we assume the 
existence of a causal nexus where it is 
wholly impossible to make a correct fore-
cast. T~s applies, for example, to the 
weather. 
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predictability seems, therefore,to be a safe criterion of cau-
sality. 
Yet, as Dr. Planck continues his analysis, he is confronted 
with a difficulty in the practical order: 
On further scrutiny, however, we reach 
a very remarkable discovery. However 
simple the conditions which we select 
and however delicate our instruments, we 
shall never be able to calculate in ad-
vance the result of the measurement with 
absolute accuracy, i.e. so as to agree 
to all places of decimals with the num-
ber measured. There always remains an 
element of inaccuracy. This is not the 
case in purely mathematical calculations, 
e.g. when the square root of 2 is calcu-
lated, which can be stated with complete 
accuracy to any number of places. And 
what applies to mechanics and heat is 
true of all the branches of physics, e.g. 
of electrical and optical events. 
The available facts accordingly compel 
us to admit that the state of affairs mS\Y' 
be correctly summed up by saying that in 
no single instance is it possible accu-
rately to predict a physical event. 
If we place this fact in juxtaposition 
with the proposition from which we 
started previously, when it was said 
that an event is causally determined if 
it can be accurately predicted, we find 
ourselves faced with an inconvenient but 
inescapable dilemma. If we rigidly 
maintain our original proposition then 
nature does not present us with a single 
instance where it is possible to assert 
that there is a caus&l connection; if we 
insist that somehow room must be found 
for strict cauraJ:Jty then we are com-
pelled in some respect to modify the 
proposition from which we started.6 
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This is the dilemma which we discussed in Chapter I (p. 17, 
18) and there we indicated the two solutions: determinism, which 
still believes in causality, and indeterminism, which calls all 
laws of nature statistical. Planck accepts the former solution, 
as he makes clear in the following passage: 
In point of fact, statistical laws are 
dependent on the assumption of the strict 
law of causality functioning in each par-
ticular case. And the non-fulfillment of 
the statistical rule in particular cases 
is not therefore due to the fact that the 
law of causality is not fulfilled, but 
rather to the fact that our observations 
are not sufficiently delicate and accurate 
to put the law of causality to a direct 
test in each case. If it were possible 
for us to follow the movement of each in-
dividual molecule in this very intricate 
labyrinth of processes, then we should 
find in each case &fl exact fulfillment of 
the dynamical laws. 
The •dynamical laws" are the pbysical laws which suppose predict-
able causality. Hence, according to Planck, causality does exist 
in nature, for statistical laws suppose that the individual is 
moved by some other being. Furthermore, his criterion of causal-
ity, predictability, could really be had but for our limited 
knowledge, and is had by an omniscient intellect: 
••• we are induced to assume that an ideal 
intellect having complete knowledge of 
to-day's pbysical events in all places 
should be in a position to foretell to-
morrow's weather with complete accuracy. 
The same applies to every forecast of 
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physical events.a 
These, then, are the first steps in Dr. Planck's theory of 
causation: (1) The external 'World must be assumed to exist; (2) 
causality, whose criterion is predictability, is as real as that 
orld; (3) in individual cases we m~ ,not be able to predict, yet 
the activity of nature is causal and can be predicted by an om-
iscient intellect. Let us now consider each of these points 
philosophically. 
First, the external world must be assumed to exist. The ex-
istence of the world should certainly be established at the be-
ginning of any philosophical inquiry, for if we are to explain 
what takes place in the world we must first be sure that the 
world exists. However, Dr. Planck does not establish this fact 
but merely takes it for granted, as his words "theorem,•9 •by-
pothesis,•10 "leap into the transcendentai,•11 clearly show. 
Now it is quite true that we cannot reason ~ the existence of 
the external world, yet we can adduce abundant evidence for its 
existence. Let us briefly examine some of this evidence. 
Fundamental to this whole inquiry is the aptitude of the mind 
for truth. If our knowing faculties are capable of attaining re-
ality, then we m~ use their testimony to show that the world 
does exist. But our knowing faculties are apt for truth, since 
to deny that they are involves a self-contradiction. One who 
asserts that his intellect is perpetually deceiving him equiva-
lently declares that he can be sure of nothing. Yet he cannot 
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denY the validity of knowledge without being certain of at least 
one thing - that knowledge is of itself failible. He is con-
vinced that he must doubt, hence he maintains that the necessity 
of doubting is most certain and undeniable. Such a state of mind 
however, manifestly contradicts itself, for the sceptic is sure o 
nothing and sure of something (the necessity of doubting} at one 
and the same time. Universal doubt, therefore, and hence the hon 
est denial of the aptitude of the mind for truth,is impossible.12 
Furthermore, there are many things of which we are naturally, 
spontaneously certain. As soon as we know what is meant by a 
"thing" we realize that a thing cannot be and not be at one and 
the same time. We also know with certitude that twice two is 
four, that the whole is greater than its part, and many other 
self-evident truths. Now in our very knowledge of these things, 
we make an implicit act of reflection, that is, we look at the 
subject and the predicate of the statement, see that these appre-
hensions represent reality, see that these realities are con-
nected., and see further that we are justified in giving our assen 
precisely because the matter is as we judge it to be. In other 
words, we implicitly see the nature of our cognition to be an 
accurate representation of reality; we verify the aptitude of the 
mind for truth.13 
Having shown that the mind is trustworthy, we may now con-
sider the evidence which it offers in support of the existence of 
the external world. The first fact is the •concept of external-
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ity, which cannot be accounted for•l4 unless there is something 
beyond the thinking subject, for 
If a man were living on an estate so vast 
that he could never reach the boundaries 
of it, he would never know - of his own 
knowledge - that it had any, and so that 
there was anything outside it or that he 
himself was within it •••• If, as the Ide-
alists suppose, this state of affairs 
could be extended to all our knowledge, 
so that we could never know anything ex-
ternal to it, we could know nothing as 
internal either, and the distinction be-
tween the two could not be drawn.15 
Other facts are the distinction which we make between possiblE 
!things and things which actually exist,the distinction between thE 
~hinge which we fancy and the things which we labor to produce, 
and the distinction between truth and error. The only explanatior. 
which can be given for our even adverting to these differences 
is the existence of the external world.16 
The facts just cited are neither assumptions nor logical 
processes. They are, if you wish, experimental evidence which 
anyone may verify for himself. Had Dr. Planck based his theory 
on some such evidence, his further reasoning would have a more 
solid foundation. The fact that he did not is, in our mind, a 
basic defect. 
Second, causality, whose criterion is predictability, is as 
real as the external world. Dr. Planck declares, therefore, that 
the concepts of cause and effect have objective validity. Yet he 
seems to confuse the criterion of causality with causality itself1 
for no sooner does he begin to discuss causality than he devotes 
~is entire attention to predictability: 
When we say that there is a causal 
connection between two events, we 
mean that there is some kind of law 
connecting them, the earlier event 
being called the cause, and the lat-
ter the effect. The question then 
arises as to what is the specific 
nature of the nexus between them. 
Is there any criterion permitting us 
to say that a given natural event is 
the effect of another?17 
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Now, although we may know the criterion of the presence of a 
thing, our knowledge is incomplete until we grasp its nature. 
Thus no chemist would be content to know merely that starch turns 
blue at the presence of iodine; he wants to discover the nature 
and further properties of the iodine molecule. Accordingly, it 
seems to us that a phi.losopher should not rest satisfied with the 
statement that predictability is a criterion of causality; he 
should examine the origin, content, and verification of the con-
cept of cause. This threefold analysis, applied by Planck himselj" 
to scientific ideas,18 reveals the following facts. 
The numerous changes taking place in the world about us are 
among the first objects of our experience. As we grow older we 
observe that we ourselves can make things change by moving them, 
altering their shape, or converting them into other things. We 
notice that in every change an object already existing acts. 
These facts are altogether unrelated in our mind, however, until 
we begin to ask the question, Why? What reason can we assign for 
a particular change? Obviously the thing which has just begun to 
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exi st is not the reason for its own existence since before it ex-
~sted it was unable to act. The reason for its existence must be 
sought outside it. This reason we call a cause. 
Furthe:rmore, we soon learn to know just what causes are re-
sponsible for certain effects. The bruise on our forehead re-
sulted from the causal influx of a particular stone; the heavy 
weight on the floor owes its present position to me. We acquire 
the concept of cause, therefore, by asking the question, "Why do 
things change?• and noting the influx of physical agents. Hence 
a cause is that which by its physical action produces another 
being which of itself cannot exist.19 
Having examined the origin and content of the concept of 
cause, let us now consider the verification of this concept in 
nature. First of all, we may say that, in general, natural ob-
jects are true causes. The same senses which bring us knowledge 
of the external world represent objects as acting upon us; thus 
not only do I perceive heat, but I perceive the heat of a fire, 
and I perceive that the fire is hot.20 Now if the fire were not 
the cause of the heat which I feel, I ought merely to experience 
a sensation of warm.th without acknowledging any source of that 
warm.th. Either, then, the fire is really a cause or my senses 
err about a most evident object and I am compelled to deny their 
veracity, saying that the real world which I know through them is 
only an illusion. This admission is altogether untenable, as we 
have shown above (p. 26). In other words, my senses reveal that 
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beinga are causes just as surely as they reveal the existence of 
things about me. 
When we try to find a particular cause for a particular ef-
fect, however, we often meet with difficulties. The interplay of 
forces in nature's activity is so complicated that frequently we 
are at a loss to decide which precise natural agents are respon-
sible for an individual effect. We do observe that certain 
things are required to produce a particular object: sunlight,air, 
and nourishment are needed for the growth of a plant. We note 
that if these are there in the proper proportions, the plant will 
mature; if they are absent, the plant will die. This is not a 
mere perception of succession - we understand that the plant de-
pends upon these factors.21 And because the effect inevitably 
results from these antecedents we can say that this inevitability 
is a criterion of the presence of causal action. Now"inevitable" 
means for the observer the same as "predictable" - he can fore-
cast the result because it will always follow. Hence predictabil-
ity may with justice be called a criterion of causality. 
Predictability, however, is merely an external sign that a 
being is a cause. What is the intrinsic reason why I am able to 
predict? It must be that the internal nature of the agent is so 
constituted that it will necessarily act if the required condi-
tions are present.22 We know that natural bodies act; therefore 
they have some internal source of activity. We know that natural 
bodies.must act if the required conditions are present;therefore 
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thi S source of activity is endowed with a necessity for action. 
Necessity, however, can be either absolute or contingent.23 
Thus it is absolutely necessary that twice two should equal four. 
AnY other result from this multiplication is simply impossible, 
and therefore the doubling of two is determined to one result in-
dependently of any conceivable circumstance. The activity of 
bodies, on the other hand, is not determined to one result with 
the same absolute necessity, for it would not involve a contra-
diction in terms if some natural cause, given all the required 
perceptible conditions, would not act. The actions of bodies are 
truly determined to one thing, yet that determination is not ab-
solutely binding, for its cessation involves no internal contra-
diction. Such necessity we may call contingent to distinguish it 
from absolute or independent necessity. 
The necessity with which bodies act, therefore, is a contin-
gent or dependent necessity. Upon what does this necessity de-
pend to be effective? Clearly it does not depend on the cooper-
ation of natural bodies or of man himself - the laws of nature 
can be set aside by neither. Only He Who is indispensable for 
the existence of a body can be likewise indispensable for its ac-
tivity, and therefore it is upon God that natural causes depend 
for their effectiveness. Let us briefly consider the reasoning 
which leads us to this affir.rnation.24 
The world exists outside the mind, as we have seen, and the 
intellect gives us accurate information about this world. Indi-
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vi dual beings which we observe in this world do not by their very 
nature demand existence, for there was a time when they were not 
and there comes a time when they cease to be what they are. Hence 
these beings need a cause for their existence. .An infinite serie1~ 
of finite causes cannot explain the real world for the whole 
series is just as impotent as is each member to produce its own 
being. Therefore some uncaused cause must ultimately be respon-
sible for whatever exists. This uncaused, self-existent Being we 
call God. He must be one, absolutely simple; composition implies 
another cause, a composer. If simple, immutable; change presup-
poses duality: a given perfection and a capacity for further per-
fection. God, then, is infinitely perfect, for He lacks all ca-
pacity for further perfection. 
It is clear, then, that natural causes depend on God at least 
for their beginning. But their activity must also depend on Him, 
for if one of His creatures could act independently of Him God 
would not be all-perfect. His power would be limited, since that 
creature would not be subject to Him.25 The harmony of the uni-
verse points to a Supreme Lawgiver Who implanted in His creatures 
tendencies to orderly activity.26 But if that Lawgiver could not 
set aside those laws in some particular case to achieve a higher 
end He would not be a ruler but a subject of His own vassals. 
Dr. Planck's third point, that in individual cases we may not 
be able to predict, yet that prediction can be had by an omnis-
cient intellect, is elucidated in the light of what we have just 
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s een. This omniscient intellect, which for Planck may be just a 
mere abstraction, is a real Being, Who suffers neither from lack 
of knowledge nor lack of power and can therefore see the true 
causes which may be unknown to us as well as direct their activ-
i tY according to His most wise designs. 
Dr. Planck, therefore, considers individual causation in its 
threefold aspect: the existence of the real world, the criterion 
of causality, the explanation of exceptions. We have endeavored 
to show where his doctrine is inadequate, basing our analysis on 
evidence available to all. Our conclusions, that the external 
world most assuredly does exist, that predictability is based on 
contingent necessity, and that exceptions are to be explained not 
only through our ignorance but also through God's omnipotence, 
will, we trust, be admitted as readily as the facts on which 
they rest. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE LAW OF CAUSALITY 
The second aspect of causation which Dr. Planck discusses is 
he principle or law of causality. This principle states: "What-
ver exists contingently requires an efficient cause for its ex-
·stence, "land the point at issue is to determine whether this 
rinciple is true universally or not. Is an uncaused contingent 
event a contradiction in terms? If so, then the statement "What-
ever happens is caused" is absolutely certain and valid for all 
ast, present, and future events. 
That Dr. Planck understands the problem precisely as we have 
stated it is evident from the following quotation. His second 
sentence is identical in meaning with our formulation of the 
principle of causality, for "whatever exists contingently" is 
the same as "every event in every instance": 
When we find ourselves face to face 
with an event which we cannot possibly 
refer to any cause or series of causes, 
and which lies outside the range of all 
the causes we are familiar with, then 
what happens? Is it perfectly certain 
and necessary that for every event in 
every instance there must be a corres-
ponding cause? Would the thought in-
volve a logical contradiction that in 
this or that case the event has abso-
lutely happened of itself and has no 
causal relation whatever to any other 
event? Of course the answer is in the 
neg~tive; for it is very easy to think 
of an event as having no explanatory 
cause whatsoever. In such cases we 
speak of miracles and wonders and mag-
ic. And the simple fact that there 
exists a whole range of literature whose 
scenes are laid in wonderland is proof in 
itself that the concept of strict causal-
ity is not an inherent necessity of human 
thought. Indeed the human mind finds 
little difficulty in thinking of every-
thing in the world as turning topsy-turvy. 
We can say to ourselves that to-)morrow 
the sun may rise in the east,l* for a 
change. We can say to ourselves that a 
miracle of nature may occur, contrary to 
all the known laws of nature. We can 
think of the Niagra Falls for instance as 
shooting upwards, though this would be 
impossible in the world of reality. I 
can think of the door of my room in which 
I am now writing as opening of its own 
accord. .And I can think of historical 
personages as entering the room and stand-
ing beside my table. In the world of re-
ality to talk of such events may be mean-
ingless and we may call them impossible, 
at least in our everydasr way of reasoning. 
But we must distinguish this kind of im-
possibility from a logical impossibility, 
such as the idea of a square circle or 
that the part of something is greater 
than the whole, for no matter what ef-
forts we make to think such things we 
cannot think them, inasmuch as they en-
tail an inner contradiction. We can 
think of a part and we can think of the 
whole to which it belongs but we cannot 
think of the part as greater than the 
whole. This kind of impossibility is 
inherent in the nature of human thought 
itself, whereas the idea of something 
happening outside the range of causa-
tion is quite logically coherent. 
Thus from the outset we can be quite 
clear about one very important fact, 
namely, that the validity of the law 
of causation cannot be decided on 
grounds of abstract reasoning.2 
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Dr. Planck holds, therefore, that human reason cannot prove 
the necessity of the principle of causality. According to him, 
"A strictly causal way of looking at things ••• is wholly compat-
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ible with modern physics although its necessity cannot be demon-
strated either~ priori or~ posteriori."3 
But, since the principle of causality cannot be proved valid, 
is it then to be rejected? No, answers Dr. Planck, it is to be 
assumed in the same way as the existence of the real world is 
assumed: 
Having once assumed the existence of an 
independent external world, science con-
comitantly assumes the principle of cau-
sality as a concept entirely independent 
of sense-perception. In applying this 
principle to the study of natural phe-
nomena science first investigates if and 
how far the law of causal relation is ap-
plicable to the various happenings in the 
world of nature and in the realm of the 
human spirit. Science finds itself here 
exactly on the same footing which Kant 
took as the starting-point of his theory 
of knowledge. As in the case of Kantian 
philosophy, so also in the case of each 
special branch of science the causal con-
cept is accepted at the outset as belong-
ing to those categories without which no 
progress in knowledge can be made. But 
we must make a certain differentiation 
here. Kant took not merely the concept 
of causality but also to a certain de-
gree the meaning of the causal law itself 
as an immediate datum of knowledge and 
therefore universally valid. Specialized 
science cannot go thus far. It must 
rather confine itself to the question as 
to what significance the law of causality 
can be proved to have in each individual 
case, and thus through research give 
practical meaning and value to the empty 
framework of the causal concept.4 
In other words, science must assume the principle of causal-
ity but not as unequivocally as it assumes the existence of the 
external world. Science is prepared to accept the world as it 
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seems to be; science is prepared to acknowledge the principle of 
causality only in those cases which she has tested. The princi-
ple of causality is therefore a helpful guide in understanding 
nature but not an absolutely certain law. This point of view is 
summed up by Planck in the following sentence: 
It is true that the law of causality 
cannot be demonstrated any more than 
it can be logically refuted: it is 
neither correct nor incorrect; it is a 
heuristic principle; it points the way, 
and in my opinion it is the most valu-
able pointer that we possess in order 
to find a path through the confusion of 
events, and in order to know in what 
direction scientific investigation must 
proceed so that it shall reach useful 
results. 5 
From the above quotations it is clear that Planck's views on 
the law of causality can be reduced to three: (1) An uncaused 
contingent event is not a contradi·ction in terms; ( 2) the prin-
ciple of causality cannot be demonstrated; (3) therefore this 
principle is not universal but to be acknowledged by science 
when circumstances justify its validity. Let us now consider 
the philosophical soundness of each of these three tenets. 
First, an uncaused contingent event is not a contradiction 
in terms, for we can "think of an event as having no explanatory 
cause whatsoever,"6 whereas we cannot think of a square circle o 
of a part greater than its whole, since these concepts "entail 
an inner contradiction."? Let us examine the validity of this 
proof. 
When we "think of an event as having no explanatory cause 
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whatsoever," what precisely have we in mind? Are we trying to 
conceive a causeless contingent event or are we simply represent-
ing nature as acting in an unaccustomed way? From all of Dr. 
Planck's examples it is evident that we are doing the latter. Now 
as we saw in Chapter II (p. 31), nature's laws are not absolutely 
necessary; their abrogation does not involve a contradiction in 
terms. The cessation of accustomed physical activity, as was men· 
tioned, is not self-contradictory, and hence conceivable. There-
fore Dr. Planck's argument merely proves that we can represent 
nature as acting differently - a fact which does not reach the 
point of the problem. 
The point at issue is not: "Can nature act differently?" but 
"Can an event happen absolutely of itself?"8 This problem,since 
it deals with a universal law, is similar to the problem of the 
whole and its part. Dr. Planck has shown how the latter is to 
be solved: by forming a concept of 'whole and part and seeing if 
there is "an inner contradiction."9 This method, which supposes 
that opposition of ideas argues incompatibility of realities, is 
perfectly valid, for the mind represents reality truly. Hence we 
shall analyze the concepts "an event" and "happen absolutely of 
itself" to see if they "entail an inner contradiction." 
An event, i.e. a contingent happening, is one which does not 
exist necessarily; its nature does not demand existence but is 
indifferent to it.10 Hence an event "happens" - it is possible 
for it to exist and it is possible for it to cease to exist; 
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there is no iron law of its inner essence requiring that it come 
into being. Yet, as a matter of fact, events do come into being • 
tbe happenings of daily life, the changes taking place in the ex-
ternal world are nothing but contingent occurrences which could bE 
otherwise. Now when faced with an actual event, we naturally ask, 
"Why does it exist?" That question, "Why?" demands the sufficien1 
reason for the thing. Now it is as certain as the principle of 
contradiction that every single thing has a sufficient reason, 
that is, has everything needed to make it what it is. He who de-
nies this principle asserts that a thing can exist without what 
is indispensable for its existence - a manifest contradiction.11 
Clearly the reason for the existence of the event is not itself, 
for then it would have produced itself; it would have existed be-
fore it actually was. Therefore the reason for its existence 
must be sought outside it, in some other being. This other being 
~e call a cause. 
The analysis which we have just made applies to every event 
which happens, for all are alike in this, that the sufficient rea-
son for their existence is not within them, and therefore in some 
external cause. Hence no event can happen absolutely of itself, 
for the idea "event" demands an external cause and the idea "hap-
pens absolutely of itself" denies that such a cause exists. In 
other words, the principle of causality, "Whatever exists contin-
gently requires an efficient cause for its existence,nl2 is as 
certain as the statement, "The whole is greater than any of its 
parts." 
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This conclusion, that the principle of causality is absolute-
ly certain, proves that an uncaused contingent event ia a con-
tradiction in terms, and therefore that the first of Dr. Planck'E 
views on the law of causality is inadmissible. His second tenet, 
that the principle of causality cannot be demonstrated, is shown 
false by the same investigation. Our analysis did estaQJ.ish the 
necessity of the principle of causality, for the predicate, "re-
quires a cause," is necessarily connected with the subject,"con-
tingent event," and that connection is known by the mind from 
the nature of the terms. The reason for this necessary connec-
tion is the intrinsic nature of the objects represented, which, 
as is evident from the above analysis, demands their intercon-
nection.13 
Because the judgment, "Every contingent event requires a 
cause," is analytic, i.e. derived from an analysis of subject 
and predicate, it is absolutely universal, for it fits the naturE 
of the thing wherever foundl4 since the concepts "contingent e-
vent" and "caused" represent two essences and prescind from this 
or that individual. These concepts are true, for the mind rep-
resents things as they are; therefore, wherever and whenever a 
contingent event takes place, it is absolutely necessary that it 
proceed from a cause. Hence Dr. Planck's third point, that the 
principle of causality is not universal, must be denied. 
From this chapter it is evident, then, that we cannot agree 
with Dr. Planck in holding that the law of causality is neither 
-43-
pecessary, demonstrable, nor universal. We must maintain, in 
~iew of the facts cited, that this principle is necessary,certain, 
and absolutely universal. And hence, in the words of Msgr. Sheen, 
If the principle of causality is meta-
physical and transcendental, if by its 
nature its foundation is its indirect 
relation with the principle of identity, 
it is therefore independent of time and 
space; if its objectivity is grounded on 
an abstractive communion with the real, 
it follows that the physical theories no 
more affect its validity than the dis-
covery of manganese affects mother-love.15 
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CHAPTER IV 
CAUSATION AND FREE WILL 
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We have seen that a cause is a heing which by its physical 
action brings something into existence. 1 In the sense of this 
definition human beings are most assuredly causes, yet the fact 
that we do produce things in the external world gives rise to a 
problem. If we are true causes, it seems that, given all the re 
quired conditions,we should inevitably produce a definite effect. 
such a supposition, however, contradicts experience by denying 
freedom to the human will. Let us see how Dr. Planck solves thi 
difficulty. 
First we must consider precisely how Dr. Planck understands 
the problem of causation and free will. He puts the question 
in the following words: 
This is one of man's oldest riddles. 
How can the independence of human vo-
11 tion be harmonized with the· fact that 
we are integral parts of a universe 
which is subject to the rigid order of 
nature's laws? 
At first sight these two aspects of 
human existence seem to be logically 
irreconcilable. On the one hand we 
have the fact that natural phenomena 
invariably occur according to the 
rigid sequence of cause and effect. 
This is an indispensable postulate of 
all scientific research, not merely in 
the case of those sciences that deal 
with the physical aspects of nature, 
but also in the case of the mental 
sciences, such as psychology. More-
over, the assumption of an unfailing 
causal sequence in all happenings is 
the basis on which our conduct of 
Again, 
everyday life is regulated. But, on the 
other hand, we have our most direct and 
intimate source of knowledge, which is 
the human consciousness, telling us that 
in the last resort our thought and voli-
tion are not subject to this causal or-
der. The inner voice of consciousness 
assures us that at any given moment we 
are capable of willing this or that al-
ternative. 2 
Each one of us is an integral part of 
the world in whic,h we live. If every 
other event in the universe be a link 
in the causal chain, which we call the 
order of nature, how can the act of 
human volition be looked upon as in-
dependent of that order? The princi-
ple of causation is either universally 
applicable or it is not. If not,where 
do we draw the line, and why should 
one part of creation be subject to a 
law that of its nature seems universal, 
and another part be exempted from that 
law?3 
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From these citations it is evident that Dr. Planck conceives 
the problem as an antinomy between the principle of causality and 
the freedom of the hum.an will. However, he understands by the 
"principle of causality• something quite different from the prin-
ciple which we discussed in Chapter III. His words, "natural 
phenomena invariably occur according to the rigid sequence of 
cause and effect," "the rigid order of nature's laws," and "the 
causal chain, which we call the order of nature,"4 show that when 
he talks of causation he is thinking of the uniformity of na-
ture's activity. That is to say, the principle of causality can 
have two meanings: (1) Every contingent thing must have a cause, 
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( 2) Every cause will produce its effect under the required con-
ditions. It is the second meaning of this principle which Dr. 
Planck has in mind. 
In Chapter III we have shown that the principle of causality, 
understood in its first meaning, is necessary, certain, and ab-
solutely universal (p. 40 - 43). We said nothing about the 
second meaning of this principle; we shall consider this second 
meaning in the latter part of this chapter. Dr. Planck, however, 
as is evident from his indiscriminate use of both forms,5 does 
not distinguish between the two. For him it is the same to say, 
"Every contingent thing must have a cause," as "Every cause will 
produce its effect under the required conditions." 
Furthermore, Dr. Planck, although he maintains that the va-
lidity of the principle of causality "cannot be decided on 
grounds of abstract reasoning,"6 believes nevertheless that this 
principle"is an indispensable postulate of all scientific re-
search," even for psychology.? Hence science must hold, accord-
ing to him, that "natural phenomena invariably occur according to 
the rigid sequence of cause and effect."8 Mental phenomena (in-
cluding volition), it would seem, must therefore be necessarily 
determined.· 
But perhaps the principle of causality, understood as re-
quiring that every cause must produce its effect, is not univer-
sal. Perhaps there are exceptions to "the rigid sequence of 
cause and effect."9 If there are, then human volition can be 
exempted from "the causal chain."10 Accordingly, Dr. Pl:an.ck 
considers the possibility of exceptions: 
For our present purpose it is much more 
important to ask whether the causal con-
nection between events must be condidered 
as absolutely complete and always un-
broken or are there events in the world 
which do not enter the chain as connect-
ing links?ll 
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Because philosophers have differed so widely in their an-
swers to this question, Dr. Planck decides that he cannot get a 
satisfactory answer from them and accordingly turns to science.12 
He observes that the physical sciences, physics, astronomy, chem-
istry, and mineralogy "are all based on the strict and universal 
validity of the principle of causality. "13 Biology,. too, "sets 
its face against permitting exceptions as such to exist.nl4 
Next Dr. Planck turns to "those sciences which deal with hu-
man events," history and sociology.15 According to his theory 
that we must test the validity of the principle of causality in 
each individual case,16 he considers a particular person: 
That individual personality has inherited 
qualities such as bodily conformation, 
intelligence, imaginative capacity, tem-
perament, personal tastes and so on. 
Working on this personality we have the 
physical and psychic influences of the 
environment, such as climate, food, up-
bringing, companionship, family life, 
education, reading, etc. Now the ques-
tion is whether all these data determine 
the conduct of this personality in all 
its particulars and according to definite 
laws. In other words if we suppose, what 
is impossible in practice, that we had a 
thorough and detailed knowledge of all 
these factors here and now, could we tell 
with certainty, on the causal basis, how 
the individual will act a moment hence?l7 
And his answer: 
••• I think that it may be said definitely 
that the direction which the humanist 
sciences, such as psychology and history, 
are developing nowadays furnishes certain 
grounds for presuming that the question 
should be answered in the affirmative. 
The part which force plays in nature, as 
the cause of motion, has its counterpart 
in the mental sphere in motive as the 
cause of conduct. Just as at each and 
every moment the motion of a material 
body results necessarily from the com-
bined action of many forces, so human 
conduct results with the same necessity 
from the interplay of mutually rein-
forced or contradicting motives which 
partly in the conscious and partly also 
in the unconscious sphere work their way 
forward towards the result.i8 
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According to Dr. Planck, therefore, motives inevitably de-
termine conduct and hence the principle of causality, understood 
as meaning "Every cause produces its effect under the required 
conditions" applies to human volition. In Planck's theory, man'E 
power of choice, i.e. his will, is determined to one line of ac-
tivity by the conditions and motives which influence it. 
After he has proposed this deterministic solution, however, 
Dr. Planck forsees two difficulties which attend it, and these 
he attempts to solve. 
The first difficulty is the fact that predictability, his 
criterion of causality, does not seem to be verified for the 
actions of men. Dr. Planck admits that "it is perfectly true 
that many acts which are done by human beings ~ppear'to be in-
explicable."19 Yet he solves this problem just as he solved the 
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problem of non-predictability for the actions of natural bodies: 
be asserts that we cannot predict because of lack of knowledge o 
the influencing motives and that such knowledge is within the 
power of higher intelligences. In his own words: 
The conclusion, therefore, is that the 
highest types of human intelligence are 
subject to the causal law in the proc-
esses that result in even their greatest 
achievements. That is the first part of 
our conclusion. And the second part is 
that in principle we must reckon with the 
possibility that a day will come when the 
more profound and increasingly more re-
fined development of scientific research 
will be able to understand the mental 
workings not only of the ordinary mortal 
but also of the highest human genius in 
their causal relations; because scientific 
thought is identical with causal thought, 
so much so that the last goal of every 
science is the full and complete applica-
tion of the causal principle to the ob-ject of research.20 
The second difficulty which confronts Dr. Planck is the fact 
that his solution contradicts the testimony of consciousness that 
man is free. In attempting to reconcile his determinism with hu-
man liberty Dr. Planck proposes a most subtile explanation. Free-
dom, according to him, does not consist in being free but in feel 
ing free. This opinion is stated in the first of his three phil-
osophical books: 
The existence of strict causality implies 
that the actions, the mental processes, 
and especially the will of every individ-
ual are completely determined at any 
given moment by the state of his mind, 
taken as a whole, in the previous mo-
ment, and by any influences acting upon 
him coming from the external world. We 
have no reason whatever for doubting the 
truth of this assertion. But the ques-
tion of free will is not concerned with 
the question whether there is such a 
definite connection, but whether the 
person in question is aware of this con-
nection. This, and this alone,determines 
whether a person can or cannot feel free. 
If a man were able to forecast his future 
solely on the ground of causality, then 
and then only we would have to deny this 
consciousness of freedom of the will.21 
-51-
Since freedom is made the same as feeling free, it is per-
featly conceivable that a man should think himself free and yet 
be determined. This is precisely the case, according to Dr. 
Planck, and the reason why the internal necessitating force can-
not be perceived is that the very act by which we reflect on our 
volition is an unperceived motive which influences the will. This 
opinion is stated in his first book: 
Complete knowledge implies that the ob-
ject. apprehended is not altered by any 
events taking place in the knowing sub-ject; and if subject and object are i-
dentical this assumption does not apply. 
To put it more concretely, the knowledge 
of any motive or any activity of the 
will is an inner experience, from which 
a fresh motive may spring; consequently 
such an awareness increases the number 
of possible motives. But as soon as this 
is recognized, the recognition brings 
about a fresh act of awareness, which in 
its turn can gaierate yet another activ-
ity of the will. In this wa:y the chain 
proceeds, without it ever being possible 
to reach a motive which is definitely 
decisive for any future action; in other 
words, to reach an awareness which is 
not in 'its turn the occasion of a fresh 
act of the will.22 
This opinion is reiterated in his second book: 
••• I am saying that in principle there is 
no reason why we should not discover the 
causal connections in our own personal 
conduct, but that in practice we can 
never do so because this would mean that 
the observing subject would also be the 
object of research. And that is impos-
sible, for no eye can see itself .23 
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Two brief citations from his third book show that his belief 
has not been altered: 
••• every application of the law of cau-
sality to the will of the individual and 
every information gained in this way [by 
introspection] is itself a motive acting 
upon the will, so that the result which 
is being looked for is continually being 
changed.24 
In other words, we might say that looked 
at from outside (objectively) the will 
is causally determined, and that looked 
at from inside (subjectively) it is free.25 
We have quoted at considerable length from the books of Dr. 
Planck in order to present his opinion precisely and to show 
that it is the same in all his philosophical works. Let us now 
look into his views on the whole question of causality and free 
will. 
The question, as we have stated, is an apparent antinomy be-
tween the principle of causality and our consciousness that we 
are free. We may tabulate Dr. Planck's views on this antithesis 
as follows: (1) The principle of causality requires that every 
cause produce its effect under the required conditions; (2) mo-
tive, the cause of conduct, determines the will; (3) a superior 
intelligence could predict any ma.n's acts, given the knowledge 
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bodies, that the scientist deals. Hence he may with confidence 
rely on the constancy of their activity. It is only when he 
says that the power to act in every cause is determined that he 
reasons beyond the evidence. 
There is evidence to show that the power to act in physical 
bodies is determined; this we have seen in Chapter II (p. 30) 
But there is likewise evidence to show that the power of choice 
in hum.an beings is not determined. To rule out this latter ev-
idence it is not enough to say that science finds the principle 
of causality indispensable for its researches.26 What science 
does need is assurance that nature's laws are uniform. This ev-
idence we have given in Chapter II (p. 30) without prejudice to 
the existence of free causes. 
Yet it may be urged that the "sciences which deal with human 
events:2? history and sociology, assume that hum.an beings do act 
in a definite way from definite motives. We shall examine this 
point more fully in treating of motive as a cause of conduct. 
However, we may note here that to assert freedom is not to deny 
rationality to man. The humanist sciences do assume that man 
will act reasonably, but if they maintain as certain that man 
acts necessarily in all that he does then they are simply as-
serting something which they have not proved and which is con-
tradicted by a wealth of evidence. 
Hence Dr. Planck's first point, that every cause must produce 
its effect under the required conditions, is an interpretation 
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of the principle of causality which is verified only for certain 
kinds of causes and has not been proved to extend to man. Con-
sequently, when human freedom is the point at issue,it is beggin 
the question to assume that every cause must act necessarily es-
pecially when no reasons other than an unproved postulate of 
science are offered in support of this position.28 
Second, motive, the cause of conduct, determines the will. 
In this and the remaining points of Dr. Planck's theory we shall 
consider the second part of his antinomy, human volition. Since 
this is an internal operation we must study it b~ means of intro 
spection, "that is, by the turning of the mind in on itself.•29 
With Dr. Planck we call this process •our most direct and inti-
mate source of knowledge•30 and we insist that the information 
acquired in this way is most certain and valid. For, since our 
mind does know reality, as we saw in Chapter IJ,31 it must have 
most certain knowledge of that reality which is closest and most 
evident to it. 
Now introspection reveals many internal acts of the will: 
emotional states such as fear and love, deliberation, consulta-
tion, resolution, choice. The following description of choice 
agrees perfectly with what each of us knows from his own inter-
nal experience. 
The acceptance of some suggested course 
or its rejection constitutes the act of 
choice. For this exercise of choice 
there must be the self-conscious reflec-
tive cognizance of at least two possible 
alternatives, though one may be mere ab-
stinence from action.32 
When we consent to either of these con-
flicting desires, we experience an ac-
tive interposition of the Ego through 
which the issue of the conflict is de-
cided. 33 
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Choice, then, as our consciousness reveals it, consists in 
selecting one of several alternatives. But the same tthuman con-
sciousness"34 which reveals to us the f!.Q!_ of choice reveals also 
the evidence for the freedom of choice. We know that several mo-
tives frequently present them.selves and that we are not passive 
spectators while one or other inevitably moves our w111.35 We 
see ourselves taking an active part, considering each alternative 
examining the prospective results, weighing the objective value 
of the inducements. All this activity, however, is ineffica-
cious until by an "active interposition of the Egon36 we 
strengthen one of the motives and decide to act upon it. 
Motive, according to the testimony of our consciousness, is 
not something mechanical, not a compelling necessity like force 
in nature. The clearest and most certain evidence shows that mo-
tive is nothing but some good, attractive, indeed, but not neces-
sitating. We do act for motives but we are not forced by them. It 
is true, of course, that sometimes we are so carried away by love 
or excitement that we can act in only one way. Yet we readi·ly 
distinguish such events from our ordinary calm decisions. It is 
likewise true that temperament, health, "physical and psychic in-
fluences"37 do affect our decisions. These factors do not neces-
sitate them, however; indeed, we praise most highly a man who 
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overcomes these internal impulses and does what he knows is right 
And thus, since we cannot deny that consciousness testifies tru-
ly, we must maintain that the freedom which it reveals in our 
actions is as real as the existence of the will itself. Dr. 
Planck's second point, that motive determines conduct, therefore; 
is inadmissible. 
His third point, that a superior intelligence could predict 
our activity if it knew all the motives which influence us, falls 
before the testimony of introspection. Since motives are not 
psychic forces but attractions to objects which we may choose or 
reject, they do not impel one to any particular course of action.· 
Hence no created intelligence, just from examining the motives 
in a man's will, can forecast with absolute certitude what he will 
do under given circumstances. However, it must be admitted that 
the normal person can be relied upon to follow certain courses 
and that this stability can give us grounds·for a type of con-
ditioned certitude called moral certitude.38 
We are sure, for example, that the cook will not poison the 
dinner, that a man will take ordinary care to preserve his life, 
that a mother will love her children. Such actions are the nor-
mal result of healthy human nature. Since this nature is found 
in every man, it is safe to say that under ordinary circumstancee 
a man will follow the natural instincts of that nature. This fact 
gives value to the predictions of the "sciences which deal with 
human events.n39 When the sociologist predicts, he does so be-
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cause he relies on the saneness of his subjects, not because he 
denies free will. And the fact that occasionally a man does vio-
late one of the primary instincts of human nature is proof both 
that the certitude of the sociologist is conditioned and that the 
beings with which he deals are free. 
We must conclude, then, that a superior intelligence could 
not predict a man's actions from the knowledge of the motives 
present in his will. To assert such predictability is to deny 
human freedom, which we have already proved. However, moral cer-
titude, which is based on the normal workings of human nature, 
can be had even by men. 
Dr. Planck's fourth point, that individual freedom consists 
in feeling free, is the most important tenet of his whole system, 
tor on the nature of human freedom depends all that he has said 
and all that he will say. If freedom means nothing but an inter-
nal persuasion that we are not subject to necessity, then there 
is nothing to prevent us from being bound in reality 'By ines-
capable physical force. However, let us see whether freedom 
really does mean a mere subjective illusion. 
Certainly, men generally do not understand by freedom a feel-
ing that one is free. "Free-will, as common sense understands 
this term, may be defined as the power .Q! self-determination. •40 
This power is as real as anything in the world about us, at least 
in the ordinary judgment of men. The culprit who is given physi-
cal punishment for abusing liberty is not conscious that his free 
act is any less real than the penalty. On the other hand, the lu-
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na tic who casts his fortune overboard may think that he is most 
free,41 while the cautious judge may feel harassed by a dozen 
different motives. Yet we know that the former is deluded and 
the latter really free. Finally, if we reduce freedom to an in-
ternal illusion, then our consciousness deceives us and scepti-
cism is the only logical consequence. Of course, it is 
our consciousness does not immediately experience the capacity o 
free choice, but it does see the evidence of freedom - that cer-
tain of our actions "depend on our consent.•42 If we are to 
the value of this evidence, then we must admit that the mind 
of itself, and this is one admission which we cannot make.43 
Freedom, therefore, does not consist in feeling free. If it 
did, it would scarcely merit the attention of philosophy. Freeda 
is something objective; it is a power or capacity in man to de-
termine his own activity. This is the meaning of freedom in the 
daily usage of man, this is freedom as it is revealed to us by 
consciousness. Dr. Planck surely would not say that the will is 
an illusion. Yet the same consciousness which reveals the exis-
tence of the will reveals to us that we are free. There is no 
reason to call the former a fact, the latter an illusion, and 
hence we must conclude that Dr. Planck is wrong in asserting tha 
human freedom means nothing more than a feeling that we are free. 
Dr. Planck's fifth poin~ is that the individual feels free 
while he is. objectively determined. We have shown, however,that 
freedom does not consist in feeling free but in having the "abil 
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i tY to settle the issue between conflicting motives by the active 
interposition of the Ego.•44 We also proved that man really has 
this freedom when we saw that the same consciousness which re-
veals the existence of choice reveals its freedom. Hence the as-
sertion that the individual feels free while he is objectively 
determined is inadmissible. 
Dr. Planck's final point, that each act of reflection is an 
unperceived determination of the will and hence that we can never 
know that we are necessitated, rests upon the opinion that this 
reflection provides a motive which disturbs the will and thus 
inclines it to another course. Such, however, is not in accord 
with the nature of motive as revealed by consciousness. Not 
every mental act is a motive, but only those whose object offers 
some attraction to the will. An ordinary act of reflection evi-
dently does not fall into this category. We must deny that re-
flection is comparable to a beam of light which disturbs the ve-
locity of a particle while measuring its position.45 This analog 
is not borne out by consciousness but is an unsupported assertio 
which is contradicted by all that we know of motives from intro-
spection. 
Of course, it is possible that in certain cases reflection 
would disturb the subject who is choosing. Yet we clearly dis-
tinguish such events from the normal consciousness of our activ-
ities. Dr. Planck's sixth point, therefore, that each act of 
reflection by disturbing the will prevents us from ever seeing 
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that we are necessitated, cannot be admitted. 
In this chapter we have considered that portion of Dr. 
Planck's theory of causation which deals with the apparent an-
tinomy between the principle of causality and human free will. 
we have noted that this principle may not be taken to mean "Ever~ 
cause must act under the requisite conditions." We were able to 
establish the existence of human freedom and were obliged to re-
ject Dr. Planck's opinion that man's will is really though un-
perceivably determined. 
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CONCLUSION 
With the examination of Dr. Planck's views on causality and 
free will we conclude our critique of his theory of causation. 
We have endeavored in these pages to sketch the setting, origin, 
and principal tenets of Dr. Planck's explanation of causality in 
nature. His theory was occasioned,as we have seen, by the failure 
of scientific prediction of events, after that prediction had be-
come identified with causality. 
Throughout his theory, however, Dr. Planck has tended towards 
the same identification. After assuming the existence of the 
real world he fastens on predictability as the sole criterion of 
causality, and then endeavors to explain our inability to pre-
dict. Similarly, he believes that an uncaused contingent event 
is not self-contradictory (since an unpredictable event is not 
intrinsecally repugnant), and therefore maintains that the prin-
ciple of causality is not universal but to be maintained by sci-
ence only when circumstances justify - in other words, when sci-
ence has found that it can predict. Finally, Dr. Planck believes 
human activity to be scientifically predictable, and therefore 
tries to reconcile determinism with our consciousness of freedom. 
The writer of this thesis has endeavored to establish anothe1 
approach to the problem of causality - the seeking of sufficient 
reason for change. Every new being requires a sufficient reason 
and therefore the principle of causality is universal. Certain 
changes result from natural bodies; these act necessarily, in 
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accord with their nature. Here predictability, at best an exter-
nal sign of internal necessity, may be had. Other changes are 
due to human beings; these act freely, in. accord with their na-
ture. Predictability of their activities is moral certitude. 
The necessity o:f physical causality and the freedom of hum.an 
causality are established from facts available to all. To pre-
sent these facts, to test Dr. Planck's theory with them, and to 
show the strength and weakness of that theory has been the pur-
pose of this thesis. It is the writer's hope that this purpose 
has been accomplished. 
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